- Standing Committee B

[Mr. Win Griffiths in the Chair]

Inquiries Bill [Lords]

Christopher Leslie: I beg to move,
That
(1)during proceedings on the Inquiries Bill [Lords] the Standing Committee shall, in addition to its first meeting on Tuesday 22nd March at 9.25 am, meet—
(a)on Tuesday 22nd March at 2.30 pm;
(b)on Thursday 24th at 9.25 am and 2.30 pm;
(2)the proceedings shall be taken in the following order, namely Clauses 1 to 48, Schedule 1, Clause 49, Schedule 2, Clause 50, Schedule 3, Clauses 51 to 54, new Clauses, new Schedules, remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(3)the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.30 pm on Thursday 24th March.
It is a pleasure to be a member of a Standing Committee under your august chairmanship, Mr. Griffiths. I am sure that you will conduct our proceedings efficiently and appropriately. We are about to consider an important Bill. The Programming Sub-Committee met yesterday and discussed the required time for debate. I accept that amendments have been tabled, but I hope that the programme motion is self-explanatory.

Oliver Heald: I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Griffiths. I know that you will use firm discipline, but in your usual courteous manner. All Committee members are looking forward to sitting under your chairmanship, and that of Mr. Gale in due course.
As for the programme motion, adequate time will be available to deal with the matters that need to be considered. There are important reasons why the arrangements for setting up inquiries should be changed. During recent years, they have been carried out in three basic ways. The Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 sets out the more informal procedure in which a Minister asks someone to undertake an inquiry. A recent example of that is the Soham murders inquiry. Sir Michael Bichard is genuinely thought to have done an excellent done job in conducting a relatively quick, effective and efficient inquiry, which went to the root of important matters.
Another course of action is that inquiries on specific subjects are allowed under various Acts of Parliament. For a considerable time, it has been thought that that system needs to be tidied up and that it would be good to have an over-arching statutory structure, which is something that we welcome. I refer, in particular, to the Saville inquiry. It has been long and, according to various estimates, has so far cost £155 million to £250 million. It is now seven years on, and we still do not  have a report. It is thought that the rather ponderous procedural progress that the inquiry is making is an example of the need to change to a more flexible and efficient system.
Improvements were made in another place. The Minister agreed to consult the chairman before appointing the panel and establishing the terms of reference. It was said that the terms of reference should be made available to Parliament by means of a statement. Other provisions were considered, such as securing the consent of the Lord Chief Justice before appointing a judge to a panel. The Minister agreed to consult the chairman about the appointment of assessors before suspending the inquiry. As for access to documents under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, it was agreed that public access should not be restricted because of the inquiry and that a reasonable belief that the interests of panel members would not affect the impartiality of the inquiry should be at the core of the appointments system.
Much progress was made in the other place, but my noble Friend Lord Kingsland said that the overall effect of the Bill would be to shift power from Parliament to the Executive and from the chairman of the panel to Ministers. I hope that there will be time to deal with other outstanding issues—I think the programme motion reflects that concern—including the idea that a resolution should be made available to Parliament to allow it to consider and approve the establishment of the terms of reference, the composition of the panel, and various rules about that.
There is room to improve the nature of the statement made to Parliament, if that is the route we follow. A written statement would not be adequate. We will argue that the Minister needs to clarify various issues to do with public interest and damage to the economy, and there should be a presumption of public access. We will also try to ensure that the Minister is not involved in the role of publication because the content and timing of the report is often extremely important. There will be adequate time to consider those matters.
As I said, I welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Griffiths, and I am sure that, as there is an experienced and caring Government Whip, the hon. Member for Lewisham, East (Ms Prentice), things will be accomplished with the co-operation and civility that has characterised our relationship over many years.

Alistair Carmichael: May I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Griffiths? This is the first time that I have served on a Standing Committee under your chairmanship, and I very much look forward to it.
Unfortunately, I was unable to participate in the Second Reading debate, so I am grateful to the hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire (Mr. Heald) for giving us a synopsis of the issues involved. As for the timetable motion, my party certainly takes the view that the time allotted is sufficient. The arguments have been rehearsed in the other place, and the Government have made significant movement on the main issue,  which, for my party as well as for the Conservatives, remains the involvement of Parliament in the whole process. I see no reason why, with a bit of good will and effort on all parts, we should not complete the business within the time scale offered.

Question put and agreed to.

Win Griffiths: I remind the Committee that there is a money resolution in connection with the Bill, and copies of it are available in the Room. I also remind hon. Members that adequate notice should be given of amendments. As a general rule, my co-Chairman and I do not intend to call starred amendments. I ask all Members to ensure that their mobile phones, pagers and so on are turned off or in silent mode.

Clause 1 - Power to establish inquiry

Oliver Heald: I beg to move amendment No. 1, in clause 1, page 1, line 3, at beginning insert ‘Subject to subsection (2A)’.

Win Griffiths: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 2, in clause 1, page 1, line 13, at end insert—
‘(2A)Any inquiry established under subsection (1) must be subject to approval by a resolution moved by the Minister in the relevant Parliament or Assembly.’.
No. 6, in clause 6, page 3, line 11, leave out from ‘section’ to end of line and add ‘must be oral’.
No. 12, in clause 14, page 6, line 37, at end add—
‘(c)make an oral statement to the relevant Parliament or Assembly’.
No. 13, in clause 15, page 7, line 16, at end insert—
‘(c)make an oral statement to the relevant Parliament or Assembly’.

Oliver Heald: The purpose of amendments Nos. 1 and 2 is to place Parliament firmly at the centre of the establishment of an inquiry by requiring a resolution of approval of the arrangements. The amendments are worded so that they would apply equally to the Welsh Assembly or the Scottish Parliament, if either body were involved.
We fully accept the need to reform the patchwork of provisions. That includes the 1921 Act, which was the basis for the Saville inquiry and the inquiry into the activities of Dr. Shipman, and other statutes such as the Police Act 1996 and the National Health Service Act 1977, which were used in the inquiry into the death of Stephen Lawrence and the Kennedy inquiry into the Bristol Royal infirmary. There is also the informal, Hutton-style inquiry, although that was perhaps thought not to be the best example, and the Soham murders inquiry, which was generally thought a very good example.
The 1921 Act requires parliamentary resolutions. Lord Justice Salmon, in his royal commission, said that there were safeguards to prevent the procedure from being too readily invoked because Parliament  had to make that resolution. Equally, on the other side of the argument, the Public Administration Committee said that it was
“deeply concerned that the Government’s Inquiries Bill threatens the last remaining role for Parliament in the inquiry process. Nonetheless it also provides an opportunity to update the current provision contained in the 1921 Act”.
It is worth also reflecting on what was said by Lord Justice Clarke, who undertook the Thames safety inquiry in 2000:
“the time has come when it would be desirable to set up a statutory framework for Inquiries generally. There is at present no generally applicable statute which covers public inquiries. The 1921 Act has been shown over the years to be much too restricted and cumbersome. In my view a statute should be enacted to give power to the appropriate Secretary of State to order a public inquiry.”
There is a mood both for change and for putting Parliament at the centre of what we do.
I fully accept that the purpose of the Bill is to provide a cost-efficient and effective way to conduct inquiries, but in a sense it consolidates the 1921 Act within it, so there is no need to remove parliamentary involvement. Why does the Minister want to do that? There is no doubt that Parliament is often concerned about the issues that give rise to public inquiries. Members of Parliament often call for a public inquiry. [Laughter.] I notice the hon. Member for Croydon, Central (Geraint Davies) laughing, and MPs do sometimes call for public inquiries because they cannot think what else to do. None the less, there are very serious incidents and issues that give rise, rightly, to public inquiries, and it is hard to understand why the Minister would want to cut Parliament out of the loop. What is he afraid of?
The Bill strengthens the Executive’s position by enabling Ministers not only to decide on the form of the inquiry and the personnel, but to influence the inquiry during its operation. Clauses 12 and 13 allow the Minister to suspend or terminate the inquiry. The Public Administration Committee suggested continuing the parliamentary role and said that, where public concern about the conduct, actions or inactions of Government Ministers or officials was involved, there was, at a minimum, a very strong case for resolutions to be passed. Clause 7, which was added in the other place, reflects that.
My noble Friend Lord Norton explained his concern that Parliament was being sidelined, describing it as being excluded from the process. He went on to describe his discussions with Ministers, saying that he had seen a copy of a letter from the noble Baroness Ashton in which she justified the exclusion of Parliament on the grounds that inquiries under the 1921 Act are the exception, rather than the rule. She made the point that there have been only 24 inquiries under the 1921 Act, so it would be wrong to involve Parliament if we are consolidating and putting together a structure for all inquiries.
My argument is the other way around. Just because the 1921 Act has proved cumbersome and its procedures expensive and long-winded does not necessarily mean that that is the fault of Parliament. It is much more likely to be the fault of the procedures.  It is often said that the Bichard inquiry into the Soham murders was extremely effective and efficient although it was informal. However, it was not a good, successful and effective inquiry because Parliament was excluded from the purpose of setting it up—far from it. The success of the Bichard inquiry is a tribute to the excellent public servant who was in charge of it and took a grip of its procedures and moved it forward.

Anne Campbell: I, too, was impressed with Sir Michael Bichard’s inquiry and report. One of the very good things about it was that he said in his report that he would reconvene the inquiry after six months to consider the progress that had been made on implementing his recommendations. Does the hon. Gentleman think that that is good practice and one that other people could follow?

Oliver Heald: Yes, it is an excellent precedent to say, “Here are my recommendations. Let’s see what’s been done about them after a particular period of time.” Parliament does not do that anywhere near enough. We pass legislation and assume that all is well. There is a strong case for better post-legislative scrutiny of what we do. I am sure that there are many Acts of Parliament that could even be the subject of, dare I mention it, a sunset clause. We would have to re-enact them after a period of time to avoid adding to the dense archaeology of law.
Funnily enough, on the Administration Estimate Audit Committee, which I chair, I recently suggested that when we make recommendations to the House authorities, we should return after a period to see how they have operated. In almost all walks of life it is standard management practice and an excellent thing to do to revisit recommendations and see what has been done. I applaud that. It shows that an inquiry does not necessarily have to be conducted by a lawyer, although I am one. One can often get a very good result by using someone who understands the system. Michael Bichard, having had a very distinguished career in public service, understands the system better than almost anyone. I do not think that there is any reason to think that Parliament would deplore the way in which Michael Bichard ran his inquiry or want to change it in any way. We would almost certainly welcome that more efficient approach.
My noble Friend Lord Kingsland identified two concerns in the other place. The first is the shift from Parliament to the Executive and the second is the shift away from chairmen to Ministers. The 1921 Act has proved expensive and cumbersome. I mentioned the Saville inquiry, but it also led to the Shipman inquiry, which many would say was an excellent and detailed inquiry that uncovered a great deal more than was originally thought had occurred. Some important lessons have been learned about the governance of general practitioners and the medical profession in general.
We do not want to lose the ability to have a detailed, thorough inquiry of the sort that was conducted on the case of Dr. Harold Shipman. I hope that Parliament could look at the terms of reference and decide the proper way forward. I hope that the Minister can accept amendments Nos. 1 and 2. An amendment accepted in the other place obliges Ministers to make statements when setting up inquiries. Amendment No. 6 would ensure that it was an oral statement so that Ministers could be questioned about the terms of reference and the conditions under which the inquiry would take place.
Amendments Nos. 12 and 13 would require oral statements on suspension or termination of an inquiry. Ministers are being given important powers to interfere in the running of inquiries and it is only right that they should be accountable. Our concerns are that we should have an effective and efficient inquiry system, but that Parliament should retain a role at the heart of the process, particularly given the shift of power away from the chairman to Ministers.

Alistair Carmichael: In broad terms, I am in agreement with the hon. Gentleman and commend him for tabling the amendments. I shall be interested to see whether he presses them to a Division as this strikes at a part of the Bill where the Government made some concessions in the other place. His party in the other place had the same basic concern as mine: the bypassing of Parliament. We wanted to ensure that the changes did not concentrate too much power in the hands of Ministers.
To that extent, the Government made a most welcome concession in the other place by accepting that the Minister should consult the chairman in drawing up the terms of reference for the inquiry. That notwithstanding, there is a lot to be said for the amendments. The hon. Gentleman said that Members of Parliament often ask for public inquiries. We follow a fairly well-established process: MPs demand a public inquiry, which we damn for running up excessive costs and, when it reports, we damn its conclusions as a whitewash. That is perhaps because the 1921 Act has been rather cumbersome, although some exceptionally fine pieces of work have been done under its aegis. One that springs to mind is the Cullen inquiry following the explosion of Piper Alpha in 1988, which had profound and long-lasting implications for health and safety practices in the offshore oil and gas sector.
However, even with the concessions that were made in the other place, Parliament is still a bit player in this Bill. If we remove the element of parliamentary scrutiny simply because the 1921 Act as a whole has been problematic, we risk throwing out the baby with the bathwater. What the hon. Gentleman proposes is fairly succinct and quite modest and I hope that the Minister will look favourably on it.

Christopher Leslie: Amendments Nos. 1 and 2 two are slightly different from amendments Nos. 6, 12 and 13. The proposal that all inquiries would need a resolution of Parliament goes a long way beyond the provisions  in the wide array of legislation on the establishment of inquiries.
The Bill replaces more than 30 pieces of legislation on inquiries on a wide range of subjects; only one—the 1921 Act—contains a requirement for resolutions of Parliament. There have been more than 30 substantial inquiries since 1990 and the 1921 Act has been used in only four cases. The amendment is not about retaining a role for Parliament per se; it would extend to every inquiry a procedure that now applies only to a small minority of inquiries and which, in any case, has not necessarily resulted in more debate about the terms of inquiry than would have been so without that formal resolution.

Oliver Heald: Equally, however, what the Minister proposes would remove the last vestiges of parliamentary control over inquiries. Given that he is an enthusiastic parliamentarian, it is difficult to understand why he thinks that that is a good way to proceed. Surely it would be better to allow Parliament to have a say.

Christopher Leslie: We would be in difficult territory if we tried to legislate specifically on how Parliament should conduct its debates and affairs, make up its mind and make resolutions. If Parliament wants to express its will on any matter, including an inquiry that has been set up, in theory it can generate, debate and agree to such a motion. Incidentally, it is the nature of the 1921 Act that an inquiry is set up by a Minister, following which a resolution is made. In a statutory context, we need to consider refining and improving the nature of parliamentary scrutiny as it exists in inquiries legislation. That is the proposal in the Bill.

Oliver Heald: At the moment, Parliament could generate such a resolution, apart from under the 1921 Act, only if the Government chose to table one and gave time to it. Is the Minister prepared to agree to a new system under which Parliament at large, or a Select Committee, could trigger such a resolution and have time provided for it?

Christopher Leslie: How Parliament and the House of Commons in particular makes its mind up about whether it debates a resolution and allocates time is a matter for Parliament. It is not for me to put that into legislation today. If Parliament wants to find a way of doing that, it will do so. Moreover, debates do not always take place solely at the instigation of the Government; there are many other ways in which they can take place.

Anne Campbell: I agree that Parliament could set up a commission, as my hon. Friend describes; there is nothing in law to prevent that. However, does he not agree that, in reality, it would be almost impossible to find the parliamentary time or to get agreement on such inquiries unless the Government chose that route? Inquiries carry large costs, and consideration would need to be given to how a freestanding parliamentary system divorced from statute would work in terms of financial control.

Christopher Leslie: I do not think that the provisions of the 1921 Act necessarily help or constrain Parliament in its scrutiny of any proposals by the Executive, particularly on the setting up of inquiries. Parliament is capable of having a debate if it so wishes, and has the resources to do so.
We need to examine the history of debates and resolutions in Parliament on inquiries. We should bear in mind the formality of some of those and the fact that only a small minority of the total number of inquiries have not required parliamentary resolutions. There are flaws in the current system that need addressing, and one of the proposals in the Bill is to improve the nature of parliamentary scrutiny of proposals to establish inquiries. One argument against the amendments is that in many instances specific parliamentary resolutions might not be desirable or necessary. It is a moot point whether hon. Members would really want formally to have approved every inquiry that might have been held from the Regulation of Railways Act 1871 to the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.
Some inquiries will, of course, raise important issues that many hon. Members will want to discuss and debate. That is why the Bill requires a statement to be made to Parliament, which can be oral and followed by debate where appropriate. Hon. Members have many ways of raising issues as normal; there is nothing in the Bill to prevent their asking for wider parliamentary debate through the usual channels.
However, some inquiries will be on a smaller scale, and on matters which, although important, do not necessarily generate widespread interest in Parliament. Not all inquiries have the public profile of, for instance, the Hutton inquiry or the Bloody Sunday inquiry. One could take as an example the inquiry into the actions of the Yorkshire gynaecologist, Richard Neale, which was set up in 2002. That inquiry was conducted under the National Health Service Act 1977—one of the pieces of legislation being repealed by the Bill—and its terms of reference were
“to assess the appropriateness and effectiveness of the procedures operated in local health services to deal with complaints about Richard Neale.”
One might also consider the inquiries into the actions of Dr. Clifford Ayling, Dr. William Kerr and Dr. Michael Haslam, which were established in the same year.
I do not suggest that any of those inquiries were not of great importance—they were. They referred to matters of great concern and that had resulted in great suffering. However, I recall the newspaper coverage at the time. I believe that The Times ran the headline, “Hague comes home to an empty house” about the Adjournment debate secured by the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague) on the establishment of the Neale inquiry, which was attended by only four MPs. That demonstrates two points: first, that hon. Members already have means of introducing debates on issues concerned with inquiries; and, secondly, that on some occasions widespread parliamentary debate is not necessary,  particularly if there is a lack of interest among hon. Members, because that might send undesirable messages.
Although I understand the arguments made by hon. Members, parliamentary approval carries potential dangers. For instance, if we have to seek parliamentary support for the establishment of an inquiry, there is a risk that it will be delayed because Parliament is in recess. If we needed to move forward quickly with an inquiry in such circumstances, there could be significant difficulties if a resolution were required but Parliament was not available to debate and make a expedient decision.

Alistair Carmichael: Can the Minister name a single inquiry of those that he has listed that would have been materially affected by a delay arising from waiting for Parliament to return, even from a long recess?

Christopher Leslie: It is not just a case of specific examples in the past; we have to legislate for all eventualities in future. Hypothetically speaking, of course I can imagine an incident occurring at the beginning of the long summer recess, when there would be an urgent need, if this amendment were passed, to get a resolution from Parliament. Delay could be detrimental to the establishment of an inquiry, which is why I am arguing against amendments Nos. 1 and 2.

Alistair Carmichael: I hold the Minister in high regard, but that is not the strongest argument that I have heard him advance. Inquiries tend to be open-ended, and because their length cannot easily be determined, that matter should be left in the hands of the chairman of the inquiry. With the best will in the world, the suggestion of urgency in holding a retrospective inquiry does not hold water. Ministers have a lot of Executive power in order to deal with matters prospectively.

Christopher Leslie: We are talking about inquiries that would, under the amendment, require resolutions of Parliament. I can think of examples of events taking place at the beginning of a summer recess, when public interest would demand that an inquiry were established and up and running as soon as possible. If inquiries were not established with due speed and efficacy, public perception might be that such issues were being kicked into the long grass. That is a serious point.

Oliver Heald: There are numerous occasions when we have to pass regulations at short notice under affirmative resolution, and if that happens during the summer recess when the House is not sitting, we find ways of tackling that through our procedures. There would be no problem in setting up an inquiry, with the approval coming a few weeks later owing to a vacation; we could tackle that procedurally with no difficulty. If that is the Minister’s only significant objection, I would be more than happy to have a long discussion with him about how we could sort that out.

Christopher Leslie: I am always happy to have long discussions with the hon. Gentleman, but I am not sure which parliamentary procedure he is talking about and how Parliament could pass resolutions during a recess. That would be quite difficult, given the nature of the drafting of amendments Nos. 1 and 2, which would require full parliamentary approval. That is one reason why I doubt that the amendments are worth while.
There are better ways of involving Parliament in debate and discussion about establishing inquiries. As I said earlier, sometimes the formality of the resolution is not the best way to secure parliamentary involvement. A statement is a better way of triggering interest and debate in Parliament. We want to improve the legislative arrangements dealing with parliamentary involvement and to move to a level that is appropriate to all statutory inquiries, and not just those under the 1921 Act. For those reasons, amendments Nos. 1 and 2 would not be a good idea.
Amendments Nos. 6, 12 and 13 concern the nature of the statement that is to be made to Parliament and the fact that it should made orally in all circumstances. In some instances, Parliament will want to debate the setting up of an inquiry on the Floor of the House, but not all inquiries will warrant that attention. I cited the example of the Neale inquiry, which attracted a meagre attendance in the House. In many ways, that could be seen to have sent undesirable signals to those with a particular interest in the inquiry.
The Bill allows for both oral and written statements because the circumstances will differ for each inquiry. Incidentally, the statements would not necessarily be only about the commencement of an inquiry, but about variations during the process of an inquiry. If there were a suspension, for example, because of criminal prosecutions or other legal processes, that would not always merit a full, oral statement to the House of Commons. I shall never persuade Opposition Members that there could be a scenario about which they would not want a full oral statement to be made to the House of Commons, but we must take into account parliamentary time and the need to have the appropriate debate for the appropriate subject. That is why the Bill takes such a flexible approach.
Of course, nothing will stop hon. Members debating issues that they want to explore. If the circumstances are straightforward, they can raise matters for debate through the usual mechanisms and press Mr. Speaker to encourage Ministers to make an oral statement or to notify the House of matters through other means. Parliament has plenty of ways in which to bring Ministers to account for decisions that have been made. That is why it would not be right to fix in place oral statements for all occasions. That is my main argument against the group of amendments.

Oliver Heald: Is the Minister about to deal with amendments Nos. 12 and 13 or has he concluded his speech?

Christopher Leslie: Essentially, I did. My response concerned oral statements.

Oliver Heald: The Minister’s main argument seemed to be that, without the amendments, Parliament could still play a role in approving the setting up of inquiries and the way in which they are pursued. I am not satisfied with that response. How does the hon. Gentleman propose that that will happen? He referred to the Adjournment debate obtained by my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Yorks about the inquiry under the National Health Service Act 1977 into Mr. Neale in Yorkshire. The fact that my right hon. Friend obtained that Adjournment debate was a random chance; it is a shuffle. Sometimes we are lucky to obtain such a debate and sometimes we are not. In one or two instances, Mr. Speaker may agree to give us a debate, but that is not guaranteed. We have no right to it; it is a matter of luck or a person’s persuasive powers.
An Opposition day is another possible route. Let us say that the matter was not one about which the official Opposition—who are delegated most of the Opposition days—were particularly concerned. For example, there was some controversy about a forthcoming inquiry that the Government have promised, which is of interest to hon. Members who represent Northern Ireland constituencies. Given how little time is available to them on the Floor of the House, could they really force an Opposition day debate in such circumstances?
Is the Minister promising to give Government time to such matters? No. Whether such a debate would happen is not a moot point. Unless some provision is made under the Bill that requires parliamentary approval, it is most uncertain whether a debate would be held on such matters at all.
The Minister said that many inquiries are held into matters of second-order importance. He referred to the Mr. Neale, Clifford Ayling and the Michael Kerr inquiries and said that such inquiries did not necessarily need a debate. I shall make two points on that. Those inquiries were quite important, but let us say that there was an inquiry of less importance. Should we not then examine the question that Lord Justice Salmon raised: is there really a case for a public inquiry? If the matter is so minor that the Minister feels that it does not deserve even a debate in the House of Commons, is it of such public concern that it warrants a public inquiry?
Turning to the inquiries mentioned by the Minister, I think that the cases of alleged medical negligence and misconduct to which he referred raised an important series of issues that Parliament should have debated. It was very important that those allegations were thoroughly examined, and the same is true of the Shipman inquiry. It would have been a good thing if Parliament had been required to debate those issues.
The Minister says that only four MPs attended the debate on Mr. Neale’s case, but one has only to think of Government Adjournment debates to see that there  are plenty of debates that the Government want to have but which attract little interest in the House. An example is the truancy debate that we had not long ago, which I think attracted seven hon. Members to the Chamber. Plenty of debates that we should have are not necessarily well attended. That may be a slight reflection on MPs. Perhaps they should attend such debates; certainly that is what The Times said.
Saying that it could be awkward to have to do what is proposed in the recess was a bit feeble. We have to pass laws in the recess and we manage to do so because we have procedures that enable us to do the formal parliamentary approval later. I would be perfectly happy to talk to the Minister about agreeing to have the approval of the setting up of an inquiry take place at a later date if setting it up was a matter of urgency in the recess. We can certainly reach an accommodation on that, but it is a pity that it has to be by virtue of work done at the other end of the building. When MPs make reasonable suggestions at this end, it is a rather sad and pitiful reflection on the Government that we then have to go through processes whereby the measure goes to the other end of the building, amendments are tabled there and then they come back here, and that amendments are often accepted there even though they were denied here. Should Ministers not consider more carefully arguments advanced in the House of Commons?
Is not the Minister saying overall that his principle as far as parliamentary scrutiny is concerned is, “If in doubt, cut it out”? That was a great maxim of surgeons at one time. If he is saying that, does he really think that it fits in with what we are trying to achieve in our parliamentary democracy? If he is saying that there is a class of cases in which approving the inquiry should not be the subject of resolutions of the House, or in which an oral statement might not be required but a written statement could be made, why will he not propose that the general rule is that there will be an oral statement or a parliamentary debate on resolutions, but that agreement can be reached between the parties by the usual channels not to have that in certain cases?
It seems sad that we have to lose the ability to debate such matters in all cases and that we are left like humble supplicants saying to the Minister, “Oh, could we please have a debate about this inquiry?”, and hoping that we will get it. If we do not, we have to try to persuade Mr. Speaker, and if that does not work, we have to go for a ballot. Why can we not say that Parliament is entitled to debate such matters unless the parties agree in the House that that is not necessary? I would have thought that we could find such a way forward.
Interestingly, I recently visited the Finnish Parliament, which works on a much more consensual basis. It seems to find the time and the ability to debate quite a lot of issues on a consensual basis without the Government feeling that they have to act in a heavy-handed way the whole time. Therefore, I do not accept what the Minister has said so far. I hope that he will  comment further on some of the points that I have made, but if he does not, I will seek to divide the Committee on amendment No. 1.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided:  Ayes 4, Noes 6.

NOES

Question accordingly negatived.

Anne Campbell: I beg to move amendment No. 35, in clause 1, page 1, line 3, at beginning insert
‘Subject to section (Inquiries pursuant to Resolution of both Houses of Parliament),’.

Win Griffiths: With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 1—Inquiry pursuant to resolution of both Houses of Parliament—
‘(1)Where it has been resolved by both Houses of Parliament that it is expedient that an inquiry should be held under this Act into a matter described in the Resolution as of public importance, the inquiry shall be held in accordance with provision made under subsection (2).
(2)Her Majesty may by Order in Council—
(a)make provision for the appointment of the chairman and members of the inquiry panel,
(b)prescribe the terms of reference of the inquiry,
(c)make such other provision in respect of the setting-up date and for other purposes as appears necessary or expedient, and
(d)make such modifications and adaptations of this Act as may appear necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the Resolution.
(3)No recommendation shall be made to Her Majesty to make an Order in Council under subsection (2) above unless a draft of the Order, or if any modifications to it are agreed by both Houses the draft as so modified, has been approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.
(4)Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 shall not apply to an inquiry held under this section.’.

Anne Campbell: I am a member of the Select Committee on Public Administration, which discussed the Bill at length. Our discussions were preceded by an investigation here and in the United States to discover the best form of conducting inquiries.
The Public Administration Committee’s conclusion was that since the 1921 Act, Parliament had to a large extent contracted out its responsibility to conduct inquiries. However, the 1921 Act still gives Parliament a role relating to Ministers’ conduct. It is important not to confuse the word “conduct” with “misconduct”, because there is a role for Parliament to examine the conduct of Ministers not when there has been misconduct but when their conduct is considered to be politically sensitive.
The Select Committee felt that since the 1921 Act, in a gradual process that has continued for many years, Parliament had relinquished its responsibility for, and its involvement in, inquiries. Many members felt that it was time for Parliament to grasp the reins and take back some control of the inquiry process, especially for inquiries into politically sensitive matters. We suggest that there should be a parliamentary commission of inquiry, perhaps modelled on Privy Council inquiries such as the Falklands review in 1983 or the Butler inquiry.
The new clause would address two distinct but complementary issues. The first is the extent of parliamentary involvement in some, but not all, inquiries and the second is the form that they should take. I confess that the proposal was suggested by the Select Committee, not by me, although I am the only member who signed it. The new clause would provide for inquiries into the conduct of Ministers of the Crown by means of an Order in Council, subject to a resolution of both Houses. That addresses the first issue, which is parliamentary involvement.
The new clause suggests that Parliament should have a role in deciding the form that the inquiry takes, and should be able to debate and decide on
“the appointment of the chairmen and members of the inquiry panel,
(b)prescribe the terms of reference of the inquiry,
(c)make such other provision in respect of the setting-up date and for other purposes ... 
(d)make such modification and adaptations of this Act as may appear necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the Resolution”
already passed by the House.
Many of the arguments were explored in the previous debate, and I do not want to spend a long time going through many of them again. I understand that the Government remain opposed to the Committee’s proposals for amending the Bill and using parliamentary commissions. It is true that my amendment and new clause would make it mandatory for Ministers to call an inquiry once a parliamentary resolution was passed. Also, the Government have complained that my proposals are ambiguous, in that there would still be pressure for inquiries from those hoping to influence terms of reference or membership; however, that could be overcome by parliamentary debate. It is true that the proposals may slightly delay the setting up of an inquiry, but I am sure that there are parliamentary procedures that could be used to overcome the delays that would occur if the House refused to pass the necessary resolutions or wished to argue about them. The Government have also argued that the proposals are excessive, in that they go beyond the provisions of the 1921 Act.
I am surprised that the Government have not taken this opportunity to do something more radical than simply tidy up the legislation. Baroness Ashton said in a letter to the Committee:
“I confess I had not seen this Bill as one of substantial constitutional significance. It is very much a consolidation measure. It does not introduce any new constitutional ideas, but  is designed to provide a single, UK wide framework that would be suitable for any future statutory inquiry into events that have caused public concern.”
If we accept that that is what the Bill is about, we are missing an opportunity to involve Parliament in the inquiry process in a way that it has not been involved since the 1921 Act. In proposing the new clause, I suggest that Parliament be involved in the examination of ministerial conduct, because I believe that that is our role. We are here to hold the Executive to account, and we would be relinquishing that responsibility if we allowed the Bill to be passed in its current form. I shall listen carefully to what the Minister and Opposition Members have to say, and I hope to reply to some of their arguments.

Jonathan Djanogly: Despite the eloquent and thorough attempt of my hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hertfordshire to persuade the Government to increase the role of Parliament in inquiries, they have turned down our party’s amendments so far. In that context, through her alternative, the hon. Member for Cambridge (Mrs. Campbell) has given us the opportunity to debate the Public Administration Committee proposals addressing the serious imbalance between the powers of the Executive and Parliament contained in the Bill.
As my hon. Friend said, the Bill contains extensive ministerial powers that could prejudice the independence of an inquiry and the very argument about the separation of powers that the Government pushed so heavily during the passage of the Constitutional Reform Bill. It seems that the Government’s constant hunger for ever-increasing powers in the hands of the Executive has unfortunately, but perhaps inevitably, entered the arena of public inquiries—a context where excessive ministerial powers could make the very exercise of the inquiry redundant through potentially politicised findings and inadequate opportunities for the views of the public to be expressed. Parliament provides a channel through which those views may be heard, yet the Bill all but closes off that channel.
My hon. Friend presented the Conservative solution to the democratic deficit. A resolution should be passed in Parliament each and every time an inquiry is launched under the terms of the Bill, but it seems clear that the Government have not, and may be unlikely to, accept such proposals. That being the case, we will support the hon. Member for Cambridge in her sensible though less far-reaching alternative to obligatory parliamentary involvement.
Amendment No. 35 and new clause 1 provide a process by which any inquiries that Parliament finds to be of public importance will be set up and regulated by Her Majesty through Orders in Council. The hon. Lady explained that the Privy Council would decide on the terms of reference, the panel, any assessors, future modifications and suspension, or premature ending of the inquiry where appropriate. That solution to the parliamentary problem is attractive on two counts. First, while it is less than we would wish to see, it would ensure more parliamentary involvement. It is hoped that that role would be given to Parliament when it is  most needed. Secondly, it would avoid the cumbersome procedure that seems so abhorrent to the Government and to other members of the Committee.
It is true that the 1921 Act was rarely used, but perhaps the amendment would provide the appropriate balance between ministerial accountability to Parliament and the pressures on Parliament’s timetable. Clearly, debate will ensue over whether an inquiry will be found to be of public importance. It is a line that no person would be particularly keen to draw, however the hon. Lady has avoided that difficult definition by leaving it to Parliament or the relevant Assembly to decide on a case-by-case basis. In the context, that is probably the right thing to do.
Would the debate over the public importance of a future inquiry negate the apparent advantage of not including Parliament in each and every decision to launch an inquiry? Quite possibly so. It is feasible that a Minister would argue that each inquiry is of public importance in an attempt to prove to the individual voters involved in each inquiry’s facts and scenarios that he takes their case seriously. The added debate about the categorisation of the inquiry could take up more of Parliament’s time before anyone has considered the terms of reference or panel members. We accept that that would need to be addressed.
Further, the freedom with which the Privy Council would dictate how the inquiry was run should perhaps be tempered to take account of the chairman’s intimate knowledge of how the inquiry is proceeding. We welcome the parliamentary legitimacy given to those decisions, albeit in a diluted form, and we merely suggest that some consultation with the chairman should be included to recognise his on-the-ground awareness of all issues affecting the inquiry.
There are problems with the amendment that need to be addressed, but in principle we shall support it as an alternative to our preferred solution, which would require more parliamentary involvement in every inquiry. After hearing the Minister’s response, the hon. Lady will have to consider whether the amendment should be put to the vote. I hope that she decides to do that. If she does not, and unless we receive a clear message from the Minister about a change of mind, the Conservative Opposition will request a vote.
The hon. Lady may be considering bringing back her amendment on Report, but if we are to have a May election, which is a possibility, the chances of the Bill having a Report stage are slim. That is why I ask that she makes her principles stand. She will have our support on that.

Alistair Carmichael: There is little that I can add to what the hon. Members for Cambridge and for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly) have said. I cannot share the hon. Lady’s surprise that the Government are not prepared to take radical action. That has been pretty much the story of the past eight years. She does, however, provide an interesting interface between the Select Committee system and the Standing Committee system. In tabling her amendment, she has done the Committee a great service.
As the hon. Member for Huntingdon pointed out, the hon. Lady wants to create a new system, and consequential amendments would have to be made as a result. I do not take that as a criticism. That is exactly the role of Committees such as this. She starts from the best of principles: that there should be parliamentary involvement. She has introduced that in a way that is, in essence, workable. I hope that, as the hon. Gentleman says, she sticks to her guns. This is one of the few occasions on which we can express a view on this issue. I would certainly be with her.

Peter Atkinson: Whether or not the hon. Member for Cambridge sticks to her guns, she has certainly done the Committee a favour by moving the amendment. I want to flag up its importance in relation to the outbreak of foot and mouth disease, which so badly afflicted my constituency. It started there and ended there about a year later. It caused devastation to the landscape and to many farmers’ livelihoods. The Government set up the “Lesson Learnt” inquiry, which was under their terms and looked at what could be done to prevent a similar outbreak in future. That was perfectly sensible, but they steadfastly refused to hold an inquiry into why the outbreak happened and whether anyone was derelict in their duty and responsible for the outbreak spreading at the rate it did.
At the time, serious allegations were made against Ministers. I have no idea whether they were founded or unfounded, but because we were approaching the 2001 election which was scheduled for May—it subsequently had to be postponed for a month—it was suggested that they deliberately failed to act with due diligence and speed so that the original May deadline would not be missed. That was a serious allegation. If it were true, it would have meant that many billions of pounds were wasted and many livelihoods ruined because Ministers, for political purposes, did not act quickly. I stress that there is no evidence that Ministers did that, but a proper inquiry would have identified the truth.
Clearly, there were other issues that never came out as a result of having no proper inquiry. First, there were serious allegations that a Ministry vet had inspected the farm where the outbreak occurred and had passed it as satisfactory, despite the visible evidence to the contrary. That was never properly explained, although some video evidence recently came to light on the state of the farm, which reinforces the view that it was inadequately inspected. Had an inquiry taken place, it would have enabled farmers who lost their livelihoods to sue in a class action. The whole issue of the treatment of foot and mouth would have been very much better if Parliament could have had a say and instigated a proper inquiry.

Oliver Heald: Does my hon. Friend agree that it was shameful that this Parliament did not hold an inquiry? Even the European Parliament had a form of inquiry into part of it, yet we did not when it was a matter of such concern to so many colleagues.

Peter Atkinson: Indeed, my hon. Friend is right. The European Parliament held an inquiry into the foot and mouth epidemic, because a lot of the money paid in compensation came from Europe and there were concerns that many farmers had been substantially overcompensated for what they had lost. That was another thing that the inquiry should have considered. There were allegations that valuers were bidding up the compensation all the time.

Terry Rooney: Is the hon. Gentleman seriously suggesting that an inquiry has to be held every time there is an allegation? While we are on the subject, what about the proven cover-up for about eight years of BSE, pre-1997?

Peter Atkinson: With respect, the hon. Gentleman has not been listening to the hon. Member for Cambridge. We want Parliament to have a say. There would not be an inquiry every time someone made an allegation against a Minister because an inquiry would be triggered by Parliament, which would not agree to inquiries every time. Surely the hon. Gentleman can understand that an issue of such huge importance that did so much damage—like the foot and mouth epidemic—should be subject to a proper inquiry. I am sure that Parliament would have voted for a proper inquiry to clear Ministers of serious allegations, if nothing else.

Christopher Leslie: I understand the rationale and reasons behind the new clause and amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge. However, she will be disappointed by some of my comments, because on reflection it would not be right to accept them.
The Bill is predominantly about ministerial inquiries, for which Ministers set the terms of reference, determine the chairman, ensure that they run smoothly and report to them. Ultimately, Ministers are accountable to Parliament, and Parliament does its job quite well in holding Ministers to account. Parliament also has its own procedures and arrangements for undertaking its inquiries, investigations and reports on matters of public concern. The Select Committee system works well. It would be wrong to shift the balance so much by inserting the suggested provision, which would go a lot further even than the existing arrangements in the 1921 Act. Under the provision in the new clause, there would an expectation for Parliament to rubber stamp, sanction and give its approval to inquiries for them to be deemed serious and important. That would jeopardise the public’s sense of value in respect of inquiries that went ahead without such parliamentary resolutions. That creates separate worries and concerns.
Let us leave to one side for a moment whether the new clause gets into the details of whether a Minister chooses the terms of reference and deals with the nuts and bolts of an inquiry. Parliament already has ample powers and scope to undertake debate, decision, investigation and inquiries of its own, if it so wishes.  Parliament could, if it wanted to, pass a motion calling for an inquiry. It does not need statutory provision in the Bill to allow it to do so. That is the nature of our constitution and parliamentary sovereignty.
The political reality is that persons other than Ministers move resolutions in both Houses of Parliament calling for the establishment of an inquiry, and if those were debated and agreed there would be a tremendous amount of political pressure on the Government to establish an inquiry. I cannot imagine that any Government would feel able to refuse to do so, and I cannot imagine the Government of the day responding to the resolutions by setting out, under clause 6, terms of reference with which Parliament would not be happy. There is no need to include a provision that imposes a formal requirement on the Government to establish an inquiry in such circumstances.
My hon. Friend said that she was concerned about ministerial misconduct and that that was one reason why she advocated the new clause.

Anne Campbell: I said that I was concerned not about ministerial misconduct, but about ministerial conduct. That is different, particularly if considered in the context of political action. I hope that my hon. Friend makes that distinction.

Christopher Leslie: The amendment mentions neither ministerial misconduct nor ministerial conduct. My point is simply that it is not clear in what circumstances the parliamentary trigger would be used, which takes us back to the uncertainty of when the parliamentary triggering process would be necessary. There are worries that it could raise the expectation that, somehow, all inquiries are in need of that parliamentary stamp of approval. Those without a parliamentary resolution might be seen as somehow devalued. We could also be getting into territory where much of the detail would still be left to the Minister to establish. The inquiries would still, effectively, be ministerial inquiries, apart from the formal parliamentary involvement at the beginning. In most respects, the running arrangements would still be decided by Ministers. I am not sure that the amendment and new clause are the right vehicles to ensure a parliamentary procedure for approval in that way.
Parliament has the power to force commissions to be held, and there is no constraint on it in that sense. The Public Administration Committee itself found an occasion—albeit the Rhodesian oil sanctions arrangement—when proceedings to set up an inquiry were begun by Parliament, which acted of its own volition. That goes some way towards proving that Parliament has the capability and capacity to generate inquiries if it so wants. The amendments are not necessary. In some ways, they could have perverse consequences, because sometimes victims’ families or those with a direct interest in the subject of an inquiry would expect not only parliamentary interest, but parliamentary approval of a resolution generating the inquiry. If an inquiry did not have that approval at the beginning, it would send the message that there were  two tiers of inquiry. I worry about that. For those reasons, I urge my hon. Friend to withdraw her amendment. I understand why she tabled it, but a statutory arrangement is not necessary to enable a sovereign Parliament to set up its own procedures for any inquiry that it wishes to establish.

Oliver Heald: Is the Minister saying that if Parliament resolved to have an inquiry the Government would not be prepared to help? That is all that the new clause is about. It says that if Parliament decides that a matter is of public importance and wants an inquiry, the Government have to do some things. Is he seriously saying that they would not be prepared to facilitate Parliament’s wishes?

Christopher Leslie: Of course, if Parliament determined to set up an inquiry and demanded that Ministers did so, we would probably respond and co-operate. My point is simply that the amendment and new clause are unnecessary. They are superfluous to the powers that Parliament already has. It would be wrong to write legislation that is superfluous because the powers exist for a sovereign Parliament to devise how it conducts its inquiries. Indeed, the amendment and new clause could be interpreted as very rigid sets of procedures, saying who should and should not set out terms of reference. Parliament might want to undertake its own inquiry in its own way, and it is not necessary to have that rigid arrangement set in statute. It is simply not needed, because Parliament already has ample scope to cope with such eventualities. On those grounds, I ask my hon. Friend to withdraw her amendment.

Anne Campbell: I am afraid that I will disappoint my hon. Friend because I am not convinced by his arguments. Defining politically sensitive inquiries is not easy or straightforward, but many of the witnesses who gave evidence to the Select Committee inquiry were able to describe the inquiries that were at issue. The challenge is to craft legislation that enables Parliament to have some involvement rather than ruling out that ability. That is what I have tried to do.
The Minister argued that practically any inquiry would have to be set up under this provision or risk legal challenge, and of course inquiries have been subject to legal challenge. The most notable was the Shipman inquiry, which was originally chaired by Lord Laming and held in private. That decision was challenged by relatives of the victims of Harold Shipman, and the subsequent inquiry was held in public, so there have been legal challenges to ministerial decisions.
The Government have also argued that inserting provisions for parliamentary involvement would subject the inquiry to delay and perhaps even prevent the possibility of having an urgent inquiry. In fact, no amendment would prevent the Government from announcing their intention to hold an inquiry as soon as they thought it expedient to do so, subject, of course, to any parliamentary procedures.
When the Select Committee took evidence from chairmen of inquiries and members of the public, we heard quite a lot about the rather haphazard way in which chairmen were tracked down and asked to  preside over inquiries. Several chairmen told us that they had found themselves agreeing to terms of reference rather speedily. There were one or two exceptions in which chairmen took time to think about the terms of reference and possibly return to the Minister and discuss them with him. However, the evidence points to the need for more time and for parliamentary consideration, rather than the haste with which some inquiries are currently established. That can lead to criticism, but the involvement of Parliament would absolve Ministers from some of the criticism that they may have experienced in the past.
The Minister again reminded me that Parliament already has the power to establish any inquiry it wishes, with any powers it deems fit. That is true, but in practice the availability of parliamentary time to debate any such resolution, other than one brought forward by the Government, is largely in the hands of Government business managers. The Select Committee suggested that that problem might be overcome through use of the Liaison Committee, but in short what is required is some surety of parliamentary involvement should Parliament see fit to involve itself in the way that we are discussing.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided:  Ayes 5, Noes 6.

NOES

Question accordingly negatived.
Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 2 and 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4 - Appointment of inquiry panel

Jonathan Djanogly: I beg to move amendment No. 3, in clause 4, page 2, line 13, leave out ‘consult’ and insert ‘seek the agreement of’.

Win Griffiths: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 4, in clause 5, page 2, line 27, leave out ‘consult’ and insert ‘secure the agreement of’.
No. 11, in clause 13, page 6, line 11, leave out ‘consult’ and insert ‘secure the agreement of’.
No. 16, in clause 14, page 6, line 30, leave out ‘consult’ and insert ‘secure the agreement of’.
No. 17, in clause 15, page 7, line 11, leave out ‘consult’ and insert ‘secure the agreement of’.

Jonathan Djanogly: The Bill is held back by a serious imbalance of powers between the commissioning Minister and the chairman of an inquiry. As we have already identified, the problem is prevalent throughout the Bill. It was debated eloquently and partially cured in the other place but, despite the valiant efforts of Lords Kingsland and Howe of Aberavon, who have considerably restricted the excessive powers entrusted to the Minister in the original incarnation of the Bill, the Minister still has extensive discretionary powers that will affect the independence, effectiveness and credibility of a public inquiry.
The other place has had a full and comprehensive debate on the topic. The arguments for reining back the potential for ministerial intervention in an inquiry are clear. They received widespread support from all, except the Government. The Committee will be aware that the many esteemed bodies that have studied the Bill have spoken out against the Government’s draconian powers to interfere in the process of an inquiry. I shall name a few: the Select Committee on Public Administration; the Joint Committee on Human Rights; the British Irish Rights Watch; the Committee on International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York—the consensus is overwhelming. Various reports underline the threat to the independence of an inquiry. The Minister’s overreaching powers would allow him to further the Government’s or his own interests to the detriment of the inquiry’s reason for being, which is to reach unbiased conclusions of the objective truth behind a set of circumstances.
It seems extraordinary how the Government continue to demand more ministerial intervention—a trend that was exemplified two weeks ago during discussion of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill. Each time, such action underlines how rarely and exceptionally—if ever—certain powers will be exercised. However, any such assurances would frankly not suffice. For so long as the powers remain, there will always be the potential for Ministers to exercise them or, indeed, abuse them. If the Minister is unlikely to use the powers, we must ask ourselves why the Government require them to be in place at all. We argue that such ministerial powers are not necessary under this Bill and will serve only to increase the Government’s desire to dominate.
It is clear and beyond debate that an inquiry must be independent. It is often forgotten that the inquiry must also be seen to be independent. As wisely noted by Lord Norton of Louth in the other place, that is
“crucial for the purpose of public confidence”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 9 December 2004; Vol. 667, c. 1002.]
When the public are aware that a Minister can, at any time, intervene in the running of an inquiry—in its terms of reference, its panel, its funding, its longevity, its accessibility and its published findings—they will not fully trust that the conclusions of the report are unbiased, independent and true. Even if the Minister has not intervened, the underlying ability to do so will  affect the credibility of the inquiry. If the objectivity of the inquiry is doubted, the report that it produces could become worthless.
The effects of excessive ministerial intervention on the inquiry process go further, because the lack of credibility that undermines the conclusions reached by the inquiry could result in calls for a fresh inquiry into the same fact scenario. That could cause duplication of work and incur costs for the British taxpayer. As such, the efficiency of the whole inquiry process could be threatened by the unnecessary extent of the Minister’s powers. Let us learn from the Bloody Sunday inquiries, not repeat their mistakes at great distress to the individuals concerned and huge expense to the taxpayer.
On a more practical note, the Minister is often not well placed to make decisions relating to the inquiry. As he will not be present at the proceedings or know all the facts and minutiae of detail affecting the inquiry, he will often not be sufficiently informed to make judgments on how the inquiry will be run. By contrast, the chairman’s close involvement in all aspects of the inquiry will give him detailed knowledge of all necessary considerations. In most cases it is the man on the ground—the chairman—who should have the final word on, or at least conclusive input in, decisions that will affect the running of the inquiry. The Opposition have sought in this group of amendments to address the imbalance of power between the Minister and the chairman. Each amendment tackles a different embodiment of the same principle.
Amendment No. 3 would strengthen the role of the chairman when appointing members to the inquiry panel. In the original Bill, the Government gave the chairman no role at all in selecting the members of the panel: it was entirely at the Minister’s discretion. In Committee, the Lords agreed to an amendment that went some way to correct that imbalance of power, and in its present form clause 4 requires the Minister to consult the chairman before appointing a member to the panel. We welcome that change, but more needs to be done to strengthen the role of the chairman. By requiring that the Minister “seek the agreement” of the chairman, he will be under a positive obligation to reach consensus. That would ensure that the chairman has more, and the Minister less, influence when choosing who should serve on the inquiry panel.
The chairman should have more involvement in deciding who should make up his panel as he will have to work with his panel as a team and have confidence in each person to whom he entrusts duties. Also, each member will bring to the panel not only different expertise but different character, and all must interrelate and work well with the chairman. As such, it is important that the chairman has greater input on the identity of each member of the panel; consultation may not be enough.
As Lord Kingsland said:
“The chairman needs to have full confidence in the panel, and therefore it must follow that he should have the opportunity to express any reservations that he has about the other members who the Minister proposes to appoint.”
The other side of the coin—that the Minister should have less say in who serves on the panel—was also recognised by Lord Kingsland in the same speech. He said:
“this would give the public more confidence in the members of the panel who are conducting the inquiry.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 18 January 2005; Vol. 668, c. GC228–9.]
Indeed, the extensive ministerial involvement in appointing the panel leaves the Government free to choose members who would be more likely to support their viewpoint or interests. Lord Howe told the Public Administration Committee that
“governments need to be protected from the temptation to rig the inquiry.”
With all the best intentions, temptation will always lie at the feet of the Minister. Although it is recognised that clause 10 goes some way to reducing the possibility of a Minister influencing the inquiry by means of the members whom he selects, the possibility of political influence still remains and the public may not feel sufficient reassurance that all has been done to ensure the independence of the panel.
Amendment No. 11 also relates to the composition of the inquiry panel. It addresses the draconian powers of the Minister on terminating the appointment of panel members. As stated by the Cross Bencher, Viscount Bledisloe, this allows members of the panel to
“be removed at the whim of the Minister if they seem to be taking a view not favourable to the Government interest in the inquiry”.
The ease with which the Minister could further the Government’s interests, to the detriment of the inquiry’s independence, could not be clearer.
Furthermore, the Minister’s power can be invoked under circumstances that leave much room for wide interpretation—for example, when a member of the panel fails to comply with any duty imposed on him by the Act or is guilty of misconduct that makes him unsuited to membership of the inquiry panel, or “for any other reason”. As noted by Lord Kingsland in the other place, that not only gives the Minister very wide powers, but
“a stark difference of view may arise between the Minister and the chairman of the panel as to whether the clause bites in any set of circumstances ... It is not unimaginable that the following may arise. The Minister may decide under subsection (3) to remove a member of the panel. He is obliged to consult the chairman before he does so. The chairman strongly disagrees with the Minister’s judgment. Nevertheless, having consulted the chairman, the Minister has completed his obligations to the chairman and may go on to dismiss the member. That could well put the chairman in an impossible position, especially if other members of the panel know that the chairman and the Minister were at loggerheads.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 19 January 2005; Vol. 668, c. GC253–4.]
Although the explanatory notes state that the Government expect the power to be exercised only very rarely, the power, which could be open to abuse and restrict public confidence, remains. Not only may a member be removed for improper or illegitimate reasons, a chairman may resign when he is opposed to a Minister’s decision, which would involve more disruption and much additional cost to the inquiry process. It is essential that any decision to terminate the appointment of a panel member, except, of course, the chairman, is subject to the chairman’s agreement.
There is inconsistency in the Bill, and it is therefore important to refer briefly to what we will be discussing when considering amendment No. 9: the Minister’s excessive involvement in the composition of the inquiry panel in relation to further appointments to the panel once the inquiry has been set up. I want to highlight the inconsistency of the Government’s approach to the chairman’s intervention in all aspects of changing the composition of the inquiry panel.
In the Bill as drafted, the chairman must be consulted before appointing members of the panel at the outset of the inquiry or terminating their appointment before its conclusion. By contrast, the chairman has no involvement in selecting members to fill vacancies on the panel and yet must consent to any appointment that would increase the number on the panel unless the Minister had originally foreseen that the numbers would be increased, in which case the chairman need only be consulted.
The inconsistency of approach is inappropriate and unjustified. The Government have not explained why the degree of the chairman’s involvement should differ so dramatically in the different scenarios, and I hope that the Minister will be able to shed some light on that discrepancy. It has the look of a cut and paste job in the other place; the common theme of the various appointment processes has been lost in all the amendments. Having said that, I recognise that our amendments relating to changes in the panel’s composition are not entirely consistent—a deficiency that the Minister can deal with on Report.
Distinctions can be drawn between the various stages of changing the panel’s composition, especially as the Minister’s power to terminate an appointment is open to greater abuse than his power to appoint members from the outset. First, the discretion on appointing panel members is qualified by the requirements of impartiality in clause 10. By contrast, as I said, the Minister may remove panel members for any reason. Secondly, the Minister’s ability to gag panel members through their removal from the panel is more immediate and more certain to have an effect than the possibility of the member following governmental interests, whether or not at the Minister’s request. As such, we have made a distinction between seeking the chairman’s agreement for original appointments to the panel and securing his agreement when terminating appointments. The appropriate chairman involvement when appointing further members to the inquiry will no doubt be debated when we discuss amendment No. 9.
Amendment No. 4 would give the chairman an equal say in how the terms of reference of an inquiry should be framed. I remind hon. Members that the original Bill allowed for no chairman involvement whatever. Clause 5 received careful scrutiny in the other place, where Lord Goodhart for the Liberal Democrats secured amendments requiring consultation with the chairman. In Committee,  Lord Kingsland tabled an amendment requiring the chairman’s agreement, which remains the approach of the Conservative Opposition for two main reasons.
First, the Minister could use his blank cheque for fixing the terms of reference to ensure that the inquiry avoids any subject matter that could be embarrassing or prejudicial to the Government. For example, he could frame the terms of reference so narrowly and precisely that certain areas could become out of bounds or be ignored. That power would be reinforced by the Minister’s ability to withdraw funds if the inquiry strayed outside its terms of reference. That issue is addressed by our amendments Nos. 30 and 31, which, I assume, will be debated later. The Minister’s wide discretion in setting the terms of reference would limit public confidence in the inquiry and cast doubt on whether it had found all the relevant facts. That, in turn, would undermine public confidence in any conclusions reached, which would make the inquiry a wasted cost.
Secondly, the fact that the Minister has the final say on the extent of the inquiry could cause serious practical difficulties. Lord Goodhart stated:
“No chairman is likely to proceed with an inquiry unless he or she is happy with the terms of reference which they are asked to undertake.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 18 January 2005; Vol. 668, c. 232]
In the context of the Public Administration Committee’s report, “Government by Inquiry”, several interviewees, including Sir Brian Bender, Lord Falconer and Sir Michael Bichard, underlined the need for the terms of reference to be finalised only with the agreement of the chairman. The report concluded that
“the chair of an inquiry should have the ability to negotiate the precise terms of reference before agreeing to undertake the inquiry.”
Furthermore, it suggested that one of the principles of good inquiry practice should be to
“have terms of reference which enjoy the widest possible consensus”.
In practice, the terms of reference will also be interpreted and applied by the chairman as the inquiry progresses. In order to ensure that that interpretation is not strained in order to further the inquiry’s goals, it is appropriate that the chairman be involved in setting the terms of reference from the outset. The amendment would also make his involvement in shaping the inquiry’s terms of reference more official, up front and transparent. We therefore strongly commend the amendment to the Committee.
Amendment No. 16 deals with the Minister’s freedom to suspend the inquiry without the agreement of the chairman. At present, an amendment introduced after Committee in another place provides that the Minister must consult the chairman. Again, our approach remains consistent with that of Lord Kingsland—that a Minister should not be able to suspend an inquiry without the consent of the chairman. Although the inquiry can be suspended only under certain prescribed circumstances—the completion of an investigation or legal proceedings relating to the same subject matter—we believe that  the clause still leaves room for the Minister to use that power for the Government’s gain, at the expense of the inquiry’s independence and effectiveness.
The phrase
“The matters to which the inquiry relates”
is very loose and it could be interpreted widely so as to apply to many different situations. Hon. Members will note that the phrase does not refer to “the same fact scenario” or even “the same individuals”, but refers to any matters to which the inquiry relates, which could conceivably be as wide as, for example, the troubles in Northern Ireland, the health service, telecommunications or social services. Indeed, had such a provision applied over recent years, any inquiry could have been suspended at any time as there are always ongoing investigations or court proceedings in relation to any widely framed subject area.
This seemingly harmless provision provides the Minister with the opportunity to suspend an inquiry at any time. The provision could be used to the advantage of the Government of the day. It would allow them to bury certain issues for a period of time, only to let them resurface when public interest had waned.
Our amendment has received wide support. I believe that the Liberal Democrat members of the Committee have added their names to it, and I look forward to hearing their input to the debate. The Joint Committee on Human Rights in its fourth report stated:
“We are concerned that both the exercise of this power of suspension, and the effect which its potential use may have, could compromise the independence of an inquiry from ministerial control. We have written to the Lord Chancellor expressing this concern, and asking whether consideration has been given to specifying on the face of the Bill the circumstances in which this power may be used, and how these provisions are considered to be compatible with the Article 2 requirement of independence.”
We hope that the Minister answers these concerns and takes the amendment seriously.
The final amendment in the group provides the crescendo to the proposed increase in ministerial power over the chairman of an inquiry. In effect, under clause 15 the Minister can end the inquiry at any time at his own discretion and for any reason. That is even more dangerous than the imprecise scenarios, which can be interpreted widely, in which a decision is made to terminate an appointment or suspend an inquiry. The provision includes no limit on the circumstances in which the Minister may bring an inquiry to an end, and such a decision could be used to hide unsavoury facts or inconvenient conclusions.
Viscount Bledisloe set out the problem clearly in a Grand Committee in the other place. He said that the Minister is
“given an absolute blanket power to terminate an inquiry at any stage without any indication of what grounds are required before he takes that course. Is he allowed to take it because the result does not seem to him to be likely to be very polite to the Government and because an election is pending? Is he to be allowed to take it because the Minister in question has changed and he thinks that his predecessor should not have set up the inquiry? However, if the provision is to remain as it is, it must at least contain the need for the sanction of the chairman.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 19 January 2005; Vol. 668, c. GC261.]
The other place introduced some parliamentary scrutiny of the Minister’s decision and reasons for bringing an inquiry to an end. We have already shown  our desire to see further scrutiny in a debate following an oral statement. However, even if the amendment finds a place in the legislation, the critical imbalance between the chairman and the Minister in this regard would not be cured. The Minister would still be able to dictate when the inquiry should end to the chairman, but the chairman should have an equal say in when it is appropriate to bring an inquiry to an end, not least because he will be best placed to know the status of the inquiry and any discrepancies and to judge independently the best way to proceed.
We have received extensive support for our proposal. Liberal Democrat MPs have added their names to the amendment and we will, no doubt, receive their valuable input during this debate.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights expressed concern in its fourth report about the wide discretionary power to terminate an inquiry at any stage, with no provision made in the Bill as to the circumstances in which the power may be exercised. The Joint Committee even doubted the compatibility of the provision with article 2 of the European convention on human rights, which could make for an interesting and expensive court case.
Serious issues arise from all the amendments. First, there are serious risks to an inquiry remaining independent when it is subject to so many discretionary ministerial powers. Secondly, there is a risk to the effectiveness of an inquiry when the chairman has so little influence on how it is run. Thirdly, an inquiry could risk losing public confidence, or its credibility, if my first and second points are not addressed. Finally, an inquiry is worth nothing without credibility; without it, it becomes a waste of time, emotion and public funds for those involved and for the country as a whole.
I trust that the Minister will give this group of amendments the attention that they deserve.

Alistair Carmichael: The hon. Member for Huntingdon has dealt comprehensively with the amendments and, as a result of that, I can be more succinct. He has indicated that my hon. Friend the Member for North Cornwall (Mr. Tyler) and I support the amendment and have added our names to it.
As the hon. Member for Huntingdon said, the crucial factor is that inquiries are independent. More than that, however, they must be seen to be independent. The hon. Gentleman’s amendments are all about power—about taking a little bit of the power from the Minister. They are not about an absolute veto, but move from consultation to seeking agreement. If that agreement cannot be obtained, presumably the power to act remains with the Minister. Without wishing to be Swiftian, the proposal is modest and, as such, I have no difficulty in supporting it.

Christopher Leslie: I commend the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Carmichael) on the concise synopsis of his argument. It contrasts slightly with the comprehensive comments of the hon. Member for Huntingdon. It is interesting to compare the two  approaches. The amendments would all require the Minister to obtain the consent of the chairman about certain decisions throughout the inquiry.

Jonathan Djanogly: Will the Minister give way?

Christopher Leslie: In my first sentence, yes.

Jonathan Djanogly: As for the length of time that I took to speak to the amendments, it is worth my making the point that, in the other place, each amendment was taken separately and debated at some length. The Minister is therefore getting off quite lightly.

Christopher Leslie: For some reason, the hon. Gentleman imagines that I was complaining about him. In fact, sometimes I want him to talk for longer. It is a pity that he was not even more comprehensive.
We are worried about giving a veto to the chairman in respect of certain decisions during the inquiry and consider that the Bill, as drafted, is sufficient and strikes the right balance. Ultimately, the Minister has the responsibility for establishing an inquiry, so it follows that the power to cope with various details as a result of that decision, including the power to appoint a panel to look into the inquiry, its terms of references and so on should also rest with the commissioning Minister. That has been the case with all past inquiries, and there have not been massive complaints about it. The clause requires the Minister to consult the chairman before appointing a member of the panel or setting the terms of reference. That requirement carries with it an obligation seriously to take into account the chairman’s views. The fact that we seek not to give a veto, should not be interpreted as meaning that we do not seriously want to have a dialogue and consultation with the chairman. Of course we do. The process must be serious.
We must remember that, in practical terms, the Minister will have to make sure that a chairman is content with the panel and the terms of reference. It would not be in the Minister’s interest to appoint members of a panel or a chairman who did not want to undertake an inquiry, given the terms of reference. That would not make for an effective inquiry panel. The chairman will have the option of walking away from the job if he is not content with the proposed terms of reference, the initial panel members or any other proposals to appoint further panel members under the Bill.
It is the Minister’s job—not that of the chairman—to set up an inquiry. As for panel membership, clauses 9 and 10 create obligations on the Minister to ensure that the panel is impartial and has the necessary expertise. If the chairman were to have a veto over panel members, that might put stress on the Minister’s ability to fulfil those obligations and could overrule his important obligations under clauses 9 and 10. That would not be right. We must remember that, when something has gone wrong with the public service system, it is the Minister’s responsibility to ensure that  it is investigated. He is responsible to Parliament for that. He or she is the person who must set out the terms of reference to Parliament and be answerable for them.
I was under the impression that amendment No. 3 drew attention to drafting issues, in that it sought to “seek the agreement” of the chairman, but not secure it. The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland suggested that that was a deliberate attempt. I am not clear how it would work in practice because to “seek the agreement” does not necessarily entail securing it. However, it would not be wise to put that obfuscation into statute.
Amendment No. 11 deals with the removal of panel members. It is extremely important to the effectiveness of the inquiry and to public confidence in its findings that the panel members are, and are seen to be, competent, impartial and respected. The power to remove panel members is needed as a fail-safe mechanism, but the Minister must be able to act to ensure that the effectiveness and integrity of the inquiry is not compromised. The Minister is accountable to Parliament. It is important to remember that it is the Minister, not the panel chairman, who should carry the can for those changes. The Minister also has a responsibility to ensure that taxpayers’ money is not wasted. If an inquiry becomes ineffective or biased, or its panel loses the confidence of the public, it may be a complete waste of money. The Minister must be able to stop such a situation arising.

Jonathan Djanogly: The hon. Gentleman says repeatedly that the Minister should be able to step in, but we are very worried about that. Can he not see that there are widely held public concerns, which go much further than those of the Conservative party, that the Government’s ability to step in could lead to unfortunate consequences that would affect the inquiry’s credibility?

Christopher Leslie: There are specific reasons and circumstances in which the Minister can remove panel members, which I will come to in a minute. The hon. Gentleman suggests that any reasons could be given, which is not the case. He also talks as if Ministers operate in a vacuum, which they do not. There are many pressures and constraints on Ministers—not just public opinion, and, ultimately, Parliament. That is our constitutional position; Parliament has ultimate scrutiny and control over Ministers, which is not to be underestimated. In our constitution, we must recognise that Ministers establish the inquiries and, as a consequence, they must be involved in the way those inquiries continue.
Of course, the chairman should be consulted about the removal of a panel member and the Minister will have to take the chairman’s views into account. The Bill sets out the process for panel members to make representations and request wider consultation with the panel to ensure that they are treated fairly. However, at the end of the day the Minister has to take responsibility for the decisions and defend them, and the chairman has to be free to get on with the inquiry. If we accepted the amendments and the matter was left  to the chairman, who is not accountable to Parliament, there is no ultimate sanction or way of dealing with his decision.
The hon. Member for Huntingdon suggested that Ministers could remove the panel members for any reason, which is not quite the case, as clause 13 sets out reasons why panel members can be removed. The first is that they can no longer carry out their duties, because of illness, for example. The second is that there is a conflict of interest. The third is a failure to comply with the duty under the Bill. The fourth is misconduct.
Amendments Nos. 16 and 17 deal with the circumstances in which the chairman’s concurrence might be sought for the suspension, or early ending, of an inquiry. Clauses 14 and 15 are designed as safeguards in case unexpected situations arise. If a Minister suspends an inquiry or ends it early, he has to set out his reasons for so doing and inform Parliament of them. Any improper or unreasonable decision to suspend an inquiry could be challenged in the courts through judicial review because Ministers are always obliged to act reasonably, and it would also be open to question in Parliament, where the Minister, not the chairman, would be held to account.
The Minister is already required to consult the chairman about suspending an inquiry or ending it early, and the Minister would have to think carefully before going against the chairman’s wishes, not least because the chairman has the powerful option of making his objections public. In certain circumstances, there can be good reasons to suspend an inquiry and a statutory requirement for the chairman to consent is not appropriate. For example, clause 14 allows an inquiry to be suspended to allow for the completion of civil or criminal proceedings, which is very important. If an inquiry was ongoing at the same time as a criminal trial, it could prejudice the trial. The Government must protect the public interest in the interests of the effective administration of justice. As a public authority, they are bound to protect individual rights to a fair trial under the European convention on human rights. It is not appropriate potentially to prevent Ministers from performing those duties by giving the chairman a veto in such circumstances.
The Minister also has a duty to safeguard public funds. If it is clear that it is no longer in the public interest to continue the inquiry, the Minister has to be able to bring it to an end; otherwise, public money could be wasted. In the vast majority of cases, there are sensible reasons for ending an inquiry with which the chairman might agree, but I am not convinced that the chairman should have the right of veto, for the reasons that I have given. The amendment would mean that in very rare situations in which a chairman weighed up the factors differently, he could insist that an inquiry continued. Taxpayer’s money could be spent wastefully on continuing the inquiry, but, unlike the Minister, the chairman could not be held accountable to Parliament for his actions in the way that our constitution currently sets out.
Ministers do not operate in a vacuum. They are accountable to Parliament and ultimately Parliament has sanctions over them. I therefore believe that this is  the best way to proceed with the Bill. I understand that there was widespread debate in the other place about the nature of the powers that might be given to the chairman. Indeed, the shadow Lord Chancellor when moving his amendment on the different powers that the chairman might have, including a veto over terms of reference, acknowledged that it would give a chairman a power
“which I think in the circumstances is inappropriate”. [Official Report, House of Lords, 18 January 2005; Vol. 668, c. GC232.]
Lord Kingsland recognised that the Government were putting forward serious issues and that we needed to protect in our constitution the power of Parliament to hold Ministers to account. For those reasons, I hope that the amendments will be rejected.

Jonathan Djanogly: As the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland said, these are reasonable amendments. They are supported by virtually every political or human rights organisation that has commented on them. The Minister has stated twice that the Government do not operate in a vacuum. His position on these amendments tends to indicate that they do, in so far as they have not listened to other people. Once again we are seeing the creeping powers of the Executive. The Minister has been up front in his response, but we cannot agree with his position here. I shall be requesting a Division on amendment No. 3, which represents the official Opposition’s position.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided:  Ayes 2, Noes 6.

NOES

Question accordingly negatived.
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5 - Setting-up date and terms of reference

Alistair Carmichael: I beg to move amendment No. 36, in clause 5, page 2, line 21, at end insert—
‘(ia)consult, as appropriate, on the terms of reference.’.

Win Griffiths: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 38, in clause 5, page 2, line 28, at end insert
‘and may consult any other person or bodies as he considers appropriate.’.

Alistair Carmichael: The effect of both amendments is to give the Minister the power to consult beyond the chairman about the terms of reference for any inquiry set up under the Bill. Hon. Members who have taken the time and trouble to read them will see that they are  identical in their effect, if not in their terms. There may be one of two explanations for that. The Committee may wish to accept my view that we have offered the Minister two versions of the same thing from which he can choose. The Committee may feel, however, that this is an inevitable consequence of trying to manage  affairs in Committee from the remoter parts of a fairly remote constituency on a Friday afternoon when deadlines for tabling amendments loom.

It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o’clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned till this day at half past Two o’clock.